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Abstract: I consider some hitherto unexplored examples of teleological language in the sciences. In 
explicating these examples, I aim to show (a) that such language is not the sole preserve of the biological 
sciences, and (b) that not all such talk is reducible to the ascription of functions. In chemistry and 
biochemistry, scientists explaining molecular rearrangements and protein folding talk informally of 
molecules rearranging “in order to” maximize stability. Evolutionary biologists, meanwhile, often speak of 
traits evolving “in order to” optimize some fitness-relevant variable. I argue that in all three contexts such 
locutions are best interpreted as shorthands for more detailed explanations which, were we to spell them out 
in full, would show that the relevant process would robustly converge on the same end-point despite 
variation in initial conditions. This suggests that, in biology, such talk presupposes a strong form of 
adaptationism. The upshot is that such shorthands may be more applicable in the physical sciences than the 
biological.   
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1. Introduction: The pragmatics of teleological talk 
The challenge of explicating apparently teleological language in the sciences (that is, language which 
ascribes ends or goals to a process or entity) has begotten a rich and venerable philosophical literature. Yet, 
were one to survey the last thirty years or so of work on the subject, one would be forgiven for supposing 
that (1) such language is peculiar to the biological sciences1, and that (2) within the biological sciences, the 
problem largely centres on a single, puzzling word: “function”.2 
It takes only a casual inspection of scientific journals and textbooks to see that the problem may not be 
quite so localized. Consider, for example, the following descriptions (drawn from chemistry textbooks) of an 
alkyl migration (figure 1), a molecular rearrangement in which a secondary carbenium ion rearranges to a 
more stable tertiary structure: 
 
“rearrangement ... takes place so that a more stable carbocation is formed” 
(Jacobs 1997, 96) 
 “alkyl migrations occur in order to make a carbocation more stable” 
(Clayden et al. 2001, 983) 
“rearrangement ... entails the movement of hydrogen, alkyl or vinyl/aryl 
group ... in order to create a more stable carbenium ion” (Anslyn and 
Dougherty 2005, 674).  
 “groups ... change positions in order to generate a more stable carbocation” 
(Sorrell 2006, 194) 
 
1 See Hull 1974, Ruse 2002 and Lewens 2007 for explicit statements of this assumption. To my knowledge, the only 
discussion of teleological language in the physical sciences in the philosophical literature is that of Wicken 1981. 
2 See Buller 1999a for a clear statement of the view that the “problem of biological teleology” is the problem of 
explicating “function”. For numerous accounts of “function”, see Allen et al. 1998, Buller 1999b and Ariew et al. 2002. 
Recent accounts include those of Mossio et al. 2009 and Nanay 2010. Many authors now favour a pluralist approach 
regarding such accounts (see Godfrey-Smith 1993, Millikan 2002). 
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Such locutions, which seem to imply that the migration is explained by an end or goal of greater stability, 
suggest that assumption (1) may be a little hasty. While apparently teleological language may be rarer in the 
physical sciences than in the biological, it is not wholly absent.3 
 
 
What of (2)? Within biology, the notion of “function” is ubiquitous. But is all teleological language 
in biology a matter of ascribing functions? Consider the following examples from recent journal articles: 
 
 “self-sacrifice evolved in order to minimize the risk of disease transmission” 
(Chapuisat 2010, R104) 
 “sexual segregation has evolved in order to minimize the impact of parasites” 
(Ferrari et al. 2010, 1292) 
“Flowering time should evolve in order to maximize seed maturation success” 
(Chuine 2010, 3151) 
“In general, colour tends to evolve in order to maximize conspicuousness to potential 
mates with respect to background contrast.” (Schwartz and Hendry 2010, 355) 
 
 
3 Talanquer (2007) has independently carried out a survey of teleological language in chemistry textbooks and has 
uncovered many more examples. 
Figure 1. A simple alkyl migration in which C4H9+ rearranges from 
a secondary to a tertiary structure. 
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Such claims are striking for two reasons. One is their superficial resemblance to the preceding examples 
from chemistry textbooks. The second is that, on the face of it, they look to be doing something rather more 
controversial than ascribing functions. They look, prima facie, to be imputing an end or goal to an 
evolutionary process (specifically, the goal of optimizing some variable), just as the preceding examples 
from chemistry appear to impute end-directedness to an alkyl migration. 
Examples of this sort do not refute (ii) decisively, for such talk might yet be reducible to function 
ascription: talk of a trait evolving “in order to” optimize some variable might be no more than an oddly 
oblique way of ascribing a function to it. I will consider this possibility in due course (see Section 4). For 
now, I merely want to emphasize that the reducibility of all teleological talk in biology to function ascription 
is not something we can safely take for granted. If we simply assume without argument that all teleological 
statements are function ascriptions, we risk glossing over important facets of explanatory practice in the 
sciences. In truth, I suspect that we are a long way from understanding the complex and varied roles of 
teleological language in the pragmatics of explanation. The detailed understanding we have accumulated 
regarding the multiple senses of “function” is a key component of that wider project—and by far the best-
developed component at present—but not the whole story. I think there is plenty more work to do. 
 I want to make a small contribution to this wider project.4 To be more precise, I want to suggest a 
novel account of the explanatory utility of the “in order to” locutions found in the examples quoted above. In 
both chemistry and biology, such locutions look to be imputing ends or goals to dynamic processes. But I 
don’t think they are: I think the real explanatory function of such locutions is more subtle—and less 
dubious—than that. Moreover, I think the pragmatic function they serve is the same in both the chemical and 
biological cases. My suggestion, in broad terms, is that “in order to” locutions can serve to highlight salient 
features of trajectories across dynamic surfaces. I appreciate that, prior to a closer investigation of the 
 
4 Naturally, this project falls within a broader pragmatic approach to scientific explanation along the lines of van 
Fraassen 1980. I do not intend to defend the basic legitimacy of this approach here. For even assuming the tenability of 
a pragmatic approach to explanation, accounting for the pragmatic function of teleological language remains a 
significant challenge in its own right. 
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explanatory contexts concerned, this claim will sound strange. The rest of the paper spells it out more 
carefully. 
 
2. How energy surfaces invite teleological shorthands 
What can it be about an alkyl migration that invites teleological language? Plainly, it is not that carbenium 
ions have evolved by natural selection (they haven’t), that they were designed by an intentional agent (they 
weren’t), or that they are in any sense capable of goal-directed agency (they aren’t). Thus, to explain why 
teleological language so often creeps into explanations of these processes, we must do more than round up 
the usual suspects. We may find the answer to be highly dependent on unusual features of the explanatory 
context in question. Alternatively, we may find that the case of alkyl migrations reveals something quite 
general about the pragmatics of teleological talk. I intend to argue for the latter possibility. First, however, 
we need to find that answer. 
To do this, we need to consider what a more formal explanation of a molecular rearrangement (of 
which an alkyl migration is one example) would look like. What such an explanation cannot involve is any 
attempt to trace the actual causal history of any particular molecule, for such causal detail is inaccessible to 
us. How, then, can we go about explaining the rearrangement? How can we explain the outcome or end-point 
of a process in the absence of fine-grained knowledge of its causal trajectory? Here is one strategy: show that 
almost any causal trajectory would converge on that same end-point. 
 
Figure 2 
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Consider a simple example. A ball is dropped on a landscape at time t (figure 2). It rolls around and, 
at time t', comes to rest in the centre. Let’s suppose we are ignorant of the ball’s initial position: all we know 
is that the ball was dropped somewhere on the landscape and came to rest in the centre. Can we still explain 
why? Plausibly, we can. For we can see that the centre is the point at which the ball has least potential 
energy; we can also see that the surface is reasonably smooth, such that a possible route to the centre would 
have been available from almost any initial position. We therefore know that a ball would settle at the centre 
almost regardless of its initial position. And this looks, to me, like a pretty good explanation. Following Kim 
Sterelny (1996), I will call explanations of this sort (that is, explanations which emphasize robust 
convergence on an end-point, rather than fine-grained causal detail of the process by which that point was 
reached) robust-process explanations.5 
Not every trajectory would converge on the same end-point, since, if the ball were placed right at one 
of the corners, it would drop off the edge. Note, however, that this does little to undermine the strength of the 
explanation. It seems enough that a large range of initial conditions and subsequent trajectories would result 
in the ball coming to rest in the centre. If the landscape were a lot more rugged, however, the explanation 
would be severely undermined. We can surmise, I think, that the quality of the robust-process explanation is 
a function of the smoothness of the landscape: the rougher the terrain, the more important it is to know the 
initial position of the ball and the precise topography of the surface. 
Detailed explanations of molecular rearrangements (and chemical transformations more generally) 
proceed along broadly these lines. We may not know the fine-grained causal history of any particular 
molecule or set of molecules, but we can still compute a potential energy surface on which each point 
represents the energy of one possible configuration. By showing that a particular outcome represents a global 
energy minimum on this surface, and that this minimum was accessible (that is, not blocked by a 
 
5 Sterelny’s notion of a “robust-process explanation” bears similarities to Jackson and Pettit’s (1990) notion of a 
“program explanation” and Sober’s (1983, 1984) notion of an “equilibrium explanation”.  All three capture the general 
insight that an explanation may abstract away from fine-grained causal detail when an outcome is robust across 
variation in initial conditions; I adopt Sterelny’s terminology only because it seems more felicitous in the present 
context. 
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prohibitively high potential energy barrier) from any likely starting configuration, we can explain the 
observed end-point (see Sieber et al. 1993 and Boronat et al. 1996 for detailed studies of the potential energy 
surface of C4H9+, the ion shown in figure 1). This is just another instance of robust-process explanation. 
The thought I want to develop is that talk of a molecule rearranging “in order to become more 
stable” is an informal way of conveying this robust-process explanation. Though I hope this strikes the 
reader as reasonably plausible (more plausible, at any rate, than the alternative, viz., that chemists really do 
impute goals to molecules!), I suspect that two concerns may arise. First, why should robust-process 
explanations invite teleological shorthands at all? Second, what makes such language useful, as opposed to 
simply misleading? 
I think the first question is easily answered. When a process drives a system in such a way that the 
system has a robust tendency to converge on a particular end-point, the system will tend to evolve as if 
homing in on that end-point, even though the process driving the change may be wholly mechanical. A 
molecular rearrangement, provided there are no significant potential barriers blocking off the most 
favourable structures, is such a process: it is robustly stability-maximizing (or energy-minimizing). A 
molecule can thus be said to rearrange as if in pursuit of greater stability. 
This line of thought suggests an answer to the second question. Why talk of ions rearranging from a 
secondary structure to a tertiary structure “in order to” get more stable, when one might just as easily say that 
they rearrange to a tertiary structure because the tertiary structure is more stable? How can a teleological 
locution help? The answer, I think, is that the teleological statement, though obviously less informative than 
a full and formal explanation of the process, still conveys more information than merely citing the stability of 
the tertiary structure. For talk of ions rearranging “in order to” to get more stable conveys not only that the 
tertiary structure was a stable end-point, but also that the stability of this end-point was the “driving force” 
for the whole rearrangement. It conveys, that is, not just that the end-point was stable, but that the process by 
which it was attained was thermodynamically driven and robustly energy-minimizing.  
Of course, the locution is also potentially misleading: it risks creating the impression that the 
molecules are really seeking out the lowest-energy configuration. A trade-off is therefore needed: the benefit 
of conveying in shorthand the idea that a process is thermodynamically driven and robustly energy-
9 
 
minimizing must be balanced against the cost of sowing misconceptions. Chemists evidently think that, in 
the context of alkyl migrations, the pragmatic benefits of informal teleological talk outweigh the costs. 
 
3. From chemistry to biology 
In chemistry, teleological talk can serve as a useful way of indicating that a process is thermodynamically 
driven and robustly energy-minimizing. Could similar considerations help explain teleological language in 
biology? At least in some cases, I think they can. The clearest case is perhaps that of protein folding, a 
process with obvious affinities to the molecular rearrangements discussed above. These too are often 
explained, informally, in apparently teleological terms: 
 
“That proteins fold so as to minimize energy has been accepted for decades” 
(Crescenzi et al. 1998, 429) 
“Naturally occurring proteins fold so as to minimize free energy” (Gupta et 
al. 2005, 1328)  
“Our current perspective tracks back to Anfinsen’s hypothesis that proteins 
fold so as to minimize free energy” (Rose et al. 2006, 16628).  
 
Such turns of phrase can be rationalized in the same way as those considered above. Proteins do not pursue 
goals; but since protein folding, like much simpler rearrangements, is a thermodynamically driven and 
robustly energy-minimizing process—an exercise in converging to the minimum on a smooth (indeed, 
“funnelled”; see Bryngelson et al. 1995) energy surface—such language can serve as a useful shorthand. 
Indeed, Rose et al. explicitly make this clarification: 
 
“To characterize this hypothesis: under folding conditions, each protein 
slides down an energy gradient to the conformation that optimizes its 
constellation of favourable interactions, the native state.” (Rose et al. 2006, 
16628). 
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In this case, the teleological statement serves a shorthand for (or informal gloss on) a robust-process 
explanation.  
 But do such considerations apply more widely? In particular, do they apply in the context in which 
teleological language is most frequently found and on which philosophers have traditionally focussed their 
attention, viz., the context of evolutionary biology? This will turn largely on whether evolutionary dynamics 
underwrites robust-process explanations. We can break this down into two questions:  
(i) Can an evolutionary process be modelled as the trajectory of a population 
across a dynamic surface?   
(ii) Will the process robustly converge on particular end-points? 
As Sterelny (1996) observes, there is a (not uncontroversial) tradition in evolutionary theory of answering 
both questions in the affirmative. It is widespread to consider evolution through the heuristic device of a 
fitness landscape, introduced to evolutionary theory by Sewall Wright (1932), and it is equally widespread to 
regard natural selection as a hill-climbing process which robustly drives populations towards fitness optima.  
I do not intend to evaluate the legitimacy of such heuristics here (for discussion of the limitations of 
fitness landscapes, see Moran 1964, Lewontin 1978, Kaplan and Pigliucci 2006). I merely want to argue that, 
if we assume that selection may legitimately be viewed as a robust, hill-climbing process, then we can 
rationalize the kind of teleological statements canvassed in Section 1, that is, statements which claim a trait 
evolved “in order to” optimize some variable. For such statements will act as shorthands for robust-process 
explanations. Just as talk of molecules rearranging “in order to get more stable” implicitly conveys not 
merely that the outcome was stable but also that the rearrangement was thermodynamically driven and 
robustly energy-minimizing, so talk of a population evolving “in order to reach a fitness optimum” would 
convey not merely that the outcome was optimal but also that the evolutionary process was driven by 
selection and was robustly fitness-maximizing.  
Consider the claim that “self-sacrifice evolved [in ants] in order to minimize the risk of disease 
transmission” (Chapuisat 2010, R104). I suggest that such a claim is, like the apparently similar statements 
one finds in the cases of molecular rearrangement and protein folding, intended as an abbreviated robust-
process explanation. That explanation, were we to spell it out in full, would claim that (a) self-sacrifice was a 
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product of a robustly fitness-optimizing process, viz., natural selection, and that (b) the trait was optimal 
because it minimized the risk of disease transmission. In general, I suggest that we can take the claim that 
some trait evolved “in order to” optimize some variable X to imply that (a) the trait was a product of a 
robustly fitness-optimizing selection process, and that (b) it was fitness-optimal in virtue of optimizing X. 
 
4. Teleological language and adaptationism 
This explication hints at a close relationship between teleological language and adaptationism. It seems clear 
enough that the rift between adaptationists and their critics must connect in some way to disputes regarding 
the legitimacy of teleological language, since adaptationists tend to find such language permissible, if not 
irresistible (see, e.g., Dennett 1995, Gardner 2009), while adaptationism’s critics tend to deem it naive and 
unhelpful (see, e.g., Reiss 2009). If, as I have suggested, we interpret talk of a trait evolving “in order to” 
optimize some variable as a shorthand for an robust-process explanation, we can see clearly where the 
connection lies. For such talk would be premised on a brand of adaptationism Tim Lewens (2009) terms 
good-designism.  
Lewens’s “good-designist” allows that some evolutionary outcomes are inaccessible (pigs with 
wings, dogs with wheels) but insists that, such constraints notwithstanding, selection tends to generate 
phenotypes which are optimal among a large range of alternatives. Such a view is often associated with 
optimality modelling in behavioural ecology (see, e.g., Maynard Smith 1978, Grafen 1991); it also dovetails 
with a definition of adaptations as traits which are optimal among a range of variants (see Reeve and 
Sherman 1993, Gardner 2009). In fitness landscape terms, good-designism amounts to the claim that 
selection robustly drives populations towards optima. Populations are not blown hither and thither by 
contingencies, winding up marooned on islands of bad design. The good-designist thus appears committed to 
the rarity of cases where constraints and contingencies matter.  
The validity of a robust-process explanation turns on the same considerations, and it is similarly 
imperilled when evolutionary outcomes are highly path-dependent. If my contention is correct—if talk of 
traits evolving “in order to” optimize a certain variable is indeed intended as a shorthand for an robust-
process explanation—the legitimacy of such talk stands or falls with good-designism. If you think an 
evolving population, like a rearranging molecule, robustly finds a way to optimality, you should find the use 
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of teleological locutions in biology fairly unproblematic. If, however, you suspect evolutionary outcomes 
tend to be rather more contingent than the good-designist likes to think, you should be sceptical of 
teleological language too. 
 
5. The difference between “having a function” and “evolving in order to optimize a variable” 
In the preceding sections, I have sought to move towards a deeper understanding of the role of teleological 
notions in the pragmatics of explanation by homing in on hitherto unexplored examples. I have noted some 
surprising locutions in scientific explanations of alkyl migrations, protein folding and evolutionary 
outcomes—locutions which appear to impute goal-directedness to the processes they describe—and I have 
appealed to the underlying dynamics of the processes concerned to explain why such locutions may be 
helpful rather than misleading. Teleological talk, I have argued, can serve as a useful shorthand when causal 
trajectories across dynamic surfaces robustly converge to a particular end-point in virtue of (a) the 
smoothness of the surface and (b) the end-point’s representing an optimum for some variable. 
If the story I have told is on the right lines, we learn from it something of the utility of such language 
in these specific contexts. But we also learn something about its hidden assumptions, namely, that the energy 
surface or fitness landscape in question is smooth enough to allow robust convergence on the same end-
point. The surface need not be perfectly smooth, but it needs to be smooth enough for the precise topography 
to be explanatorily irrelevant. In the context of protein folding, this assumption is embodied in the principle 
of minimal frustration: the principle (advanced by Bryngelson et al. 1995) that the energy landscapes of 
proteins have a smooth, “funnel” shape devoid of “kinetic traps”, local minima in which a protein may 
become disadvantageously lodged. In the context of evolutionary theory, as we have seen, this assumption 
amounts to a strong form of adaptationism. 
It is this hidden assumption that can make talk of a trait evolving “in order to” optimize a variable 
dubious even when a function may be legitimately ascribed to that trait. This can be seen in cases in which 
an evolutionary outcome, though perhaps still locally optimal, is highly dependent on various constraints and 
contingencies. Consider the panda’s thumb, Stephen Jay Gould’s (1978) famous example of a “clumsy” trait, 
the result of selection working as “an excellent tinkerer, not a divine artificer” (1978, 30). The panda’s 
thumb is not a digit: it is a hugely enlarged radial sesamoid, a type of bone that, in other mammals, stays in 
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the wrist. It nevertheless manages to be quite good at stripping bamboo. It sounds reasonable enough to say 
that the panda’s thumb has the function of stripping bamboo. But could we plausibly say that the trait 
evolved in order to maximize bamboo-stripping efficiency? The teleological explanation seems to ignore 
something important, namely that the form of the trait was highly constrained by the materials natural 
selection had to work with. Somewhere on the relevant fitness landscape, there may well have been a peak 
corresponding to pandas with well-adapted digits rather than hugely enlarged radial sesamoids, but, from 
their actual starting point, pandas simply could not get there. Though the trait may still represent a local 
optimum, contingencies and constraints were highly relevant in determining the end-point of cumulative 
selection. In these circumstances, function ascriptions remain possible, yet more richly teleological talk of 
traits evolving “in order to” optimize some variable becomes inappropriate.  
Such cases make it plain that these locutions are more than oddly oblique ways of ascribing a 
function to a trait. They imply a substantive and contentious claim about the selection process by which the 
trait was produced, a claim that a mere function ascription (on any account of such ascriptions) does not 
imply. For talk of a trait evolving “in order to” optimize a variable implies that the process by which the trait 
was produced was robustly fitness-optimizing. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In explanations of molecular rearrangements—including the elaborate case of protein folding—teleological 
“in order to” locutions can usefully convey the information that a process would robustly converge on a 
particular end-point. They may, in principle, serve a similar function in evolutionary biology, but only 
conditional on a substantial form of empirical adaptationism. The use of such talk in biology thus amounts to 
an empirical bet that its adaptationist presuppositions obtain.  
The upshot is that, while talk of a system evolving “in order to” optimize some variable is often 
pragmatically useful in chemistry (and biochemistry), its utility in evolutionary biology remains 
questionable. Hence, this form of teleological language, far from being the sole preserve of biology, may be 
more useful—and less misleading—in the physical sciences than the biological. This observation should, if 
nothing else, alert us to the errors embodied in assumptions (1) and (2). If we seek a full understanding of the 
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pragmatics of teleological language in the sciences, we need to look beyond “function”—and beyond 
biology. 
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